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Globalization and the informalization of the urban space1 
 
Elmar Altvater2 
 
 
Cities reflect in geographical space the class and gender structure of a historical 
society, the ethnic, religious and racial cleavages, the emergence of informal 
structures in labour, money and politics1 and last but not least, the global context 
on a local scale. Therefore, they can best be understood as ‘glocalized’ spaces. 
The global, informal city therefore distinguishes itself from the industrial city of 
the nineteenth century and the ‘Fordist’ city of the twentieth century, although 
informality in these urban spaces is not at all unusual. Three megatrends seem at 
first glance to be responsible for this outcome: urbanization, globalization and 
informalization, and their mutual articulation. In the following sections I will 
briefly deal with each of them before concluding with an attempt to identify 
their aggregate potentiality. 
 
 
First Megatrend: Urbanization 
 
Cities first came into existence during the Neolithic Revolution – culture arises 
from agriculture, as Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen aptly points out.2 Cities were 
centres of culture, markets for the exchange of agricultural surplus, 
communication (the annual markets, the ‘kermesse’ were always information 
markets), the arts and science. Rulers – religious, military and political – always 
had their homes in cities. The land was ruled from the city, in order to skim the 
cream off the agricultural surplus. Otherwise the land followed its own daily and 
seasonal rhythms. Large parts of the land were well beyond the reach of the 
cities anyway (‘Russia is big and the Tsar is far away’, as the popular saying 
goes), and well into the twentieth century, the vast majority of the population 
lived on the land and from the land.  
  
Modern urbanization begins with the industrial revolution. The new industrial 
areas in middle England, the Ruhrgebiet, Upper Silesia and the industrial belts 
from Chicago and Detroit to the Great Lakes have a very recent history. The 
accumulation of capital produced the ‘spatial fix’ (David Harvey) of urban 
agglomeration. The geography of the industrial era is a different from the 
previous time. And the more the industrial system expanded, and the more 
agriculture was industrialized, the fewer people were needed on the land. Eric 
                                                          
*   Paper related to a guest lecture given at Research Center on Development and International Relations in 
October 2004.  
** Elmar Altvater was Professor at Free University, Berlin, Germany. 
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Hobsbawm in his The Age of Extremes writes that in the ‘short twentieth century 
from 1917 until 1989’ only one revolution actually occurred: For the first time 
in human history, a minority of mankind worked in agriculture and the great 
majority in industry.3 Independence from the products of land and from solar 
energy triggered the massive move of peoples from the countryside into the 
cities. The industrial revolution is based on the trinity of fossil fuels, European 
rationality and technical devices, and the transformation of money into capital. 
This revolution also created the modern juxtaposition of countryside and city, 
the growth of urban agglomerations and the de-population of rural areas, the 
concentration of wealth and power in the cities and their diffusion in the 
countryside, the emergence of global economic, social, military, cultural 
networks with nodes; that is, the development of global cities and empty spaces 
(i.e., the ‘rest of the world’) with regard to political power and economic wealth. 
 
In the early phase of capitalism, landless and jobless people were forced by the 
state into work or reform houses where they were prepared for the discipline of 
manufacturing and industry. Later this was no longer necessary; the working 
people adjusted to the new disciplinary order with their own rhythms of space 
and time. The cities were attractive compared to the ‘idiocy of rural life’, and 
un-rooted masses were drawn into them. Marx and Engels in the Communist 
Manifesto described this process emphatically as the progress of the bourgeois 
world compared to the old narrow-minded feudal system. The growth of the 
cities exceeded their ability to absorb, so that many people ended up not in 
industry but rather in what we today refer to as the informal sector. Cities as 
they expand typically develop a three-tiered arrangement: The well-ordered 
quarter for the urban elite with high income and good infrastructure; the extreme 
opposite is to be found in the ‘favelas’, the ‘bidonvilles’ or ‘shantytowns’ and 
bairros or barrios of the poor and excluded, poorly situated and with precarious 
living conditions. Incomes here are often derived from the exploding informal 
sector (even though this term only comes into popular use in the 1970s) and 
illegal or criminal activity. The third quarter is for the official, formal labour 
force, who live in developments or complexes in the tradition of the Bauhaus-
architecture of Gropius or of Corbusier’s living machine. They emanate the 
spirit of mass production, mass consumption, mass inhabitation, and mass 
fabrication of buildings as well as of massive natural exploitation. The three-tier 
city, however, today belongs to the past due to the disappearance of Fordist 
stratification. Instead, a two-tier order is emerging: a city of the informals and a 
city of the rich, in most cases divided from each other by protected walls 
surrounding gated areas. 
 
During the last 50 years the number of people living in cities increased from 740 
million to 2.9 billion. On average nearly every second person is living in a city, 
and the number of big cities (of more than a million inhabitants) is increasing. In 
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1950 there existed only one metropole with more than 10 million inhabitants in 
the world, New York with 12.3 million; in the year 2000 there were already 19, 
and the number for 2015 is estimated to be more than 20.  
 
Table 1:  
The Megacities of the World – from 1950 until 2015 (population in millions). 
 
1950 1975 2000 2015 
City         Population City         Population City         Population City         Population 
New York        12.3 
 
Tokyo               19.8 
New York         15.9 
Shanghai           11.4 
Mexico City      11.2 
Sao Paulo             10 
Tokyo                26.4 
Mexico City      18.1 
Bombay             18.1 
Sao Paulo          17.8 
New York         16.6 
Lagos                13.4 
Los Angeles      13.1 
Calcutta             12.9 
Shanghai           12.9 
Buenos Aires     12.9 
Dhaka                12.3 
Karachi              11.8 
Delhi                 11.7 
Jakarta                  11 
Osaka                   11 
Metro Manila    10.9 
Beijing              10.6 
Rio de Janeiro   10.6 
Cairo                 10.6 
Tokyo                 26,4 
Bombay             26.1 
Lagos                23.2 
Dhaka                21.1 
Sao Paulo          20.4 
Karachi              19.2 
Mexico City      19.2 
New York         17.4 
Jakarta               17.3 
Calcutta             17.3 
Delhi                 16.8 
Metro Manila    14.8 
Shanghai           14.6 
Los Angeles      14.1 
Buenos Aires     14.1 
Cairo                 13.8 
Istanbul             12.5 
Beijing              12.3 
Rio de Janeiro   11.9 
Osaka                   11 
Tianjin               10.7 
Hydarabad         10.5 
Bangkok            10.1 
Source: Global Trends 2002, p. 104. 
 
In most countries of the world the share of urban population increased, as the 
demographic trends collected by UNDP clearly exhibit. 
  
The impressive trend towards urbanization exerts a decisive impact on the social 
structure and on social as well as human development. Only a few aspects can 
be addressed here. First of all, the ecological consequences of urbanization are 
extreme, due to a progressive increase of energy combustion, consumption of 
agricultural and mineral resources and waste production. The city requires 
massive surface area, energy, and disposal sites for urban emissions (garbage, 
waste air, sewage). Even a vertically-oriented city like New York requires a 
huge surface area to supply water, groceries and energy and dispose of sewage, 
waste air and garbage from its 70-plus-story skyscrapers; the assumption that a 
city concentrated on a small surface area grows only upwards is an illusion, 
emanating from high prices of real estate. The New York principle is no better 
than the Los Angeles principle. As a rule, urban life leaves large ‘ecological 
footprints’. Paradoxically, however, the ecologically devastating waste 
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production creates income opportunities for garbage collectors and therefore 
widens spaces for the development of the ‘informal sector’.  
 
Table 2: 
Share of urban population as percentage of total population. 
 
Urban Population Country 
1975 2000 2015 
United States 73.7 77.2 81.0 
Japan 75.7 78.8 81.5 
United Kingdom 88.7 89.5 90.8 
Germany 81.2 87.5 89.9 
Argentina 80.7 88.2 90.2 
Chile 78.4 85.8 89.1 
Mexico 62.8 74.4 77.9 
Russian Federation 66.4 72.9 74.0 
Colombia 60.0 75.0 81.3 
Venezuela 75.8 86.9 90.0 
Thailand 15.1 19.8 24.2 
Peru 61.5 72.8 77.9 
Ecuador 42.4 63.0 69.4 
China 17.4 35.8 49.5 
Indonesia 19.4 41.0 55.0 
Bolivia 41.3 62.4 69.9 
India 21.3 27.7 32.2 
Pakistan 26.4 33.1 39.5 
Bangladesh 9.9 25.0 34.4 
Source: UNDP 2002, p. 192 passim. 
 
The security of urban supply requires food for inhabitants, energy and water for 
industrial and domestic consumption and the disposal of sewage and garbage. In 
the course of economic development, temporal and spatial externalization takes 
place. Heinrich von Thünen conceived of food production for the city in the 
form of concentric circles around the city. Obviously, this is no longer the case 
today. A relationship to the land around the city has largely disappeared. With 
the help of logistical chains, the goods of daily consumption are brought in from 
great distances: in the 1990s, a large portion of the mineral water in Almaty in 
Kazakhstan came from the German Federal Republic, 4000 km away, rather 
than from the mountains surrounding it. German mineral water companies with 
superior logistics were able to beat out the local competition. The tomatoes in 
the Ver-o-peso market in Belém do Parà are being imported primarily from Sao 
Paulo, 4000 km away, and only in insignificant quantities from the nearby 
tomato fields of Sao Tomé. The fresh tuna for sushi in New York is flown in 
from the Pacific. The wine in a standard supermarket in Berlin comes from 
South Africa, Chile, Australia and of course France and Italy. Transportation 
over long distances represents an enormous ecological problem. The transport 
involved in world trade requires the amount of energy consumed by a population 
of 150 million, like that of Brazil, not to mention the further environmental 
consequences of urban consumption. The city therefore is in itself an ecological 
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problem, because it fosters globalization, and enlarges the geographical reach 
due to the facilitation of transportation powered by fossil fuels.  
 
Secondly, urbanization reflects a shift in the social structure of a given society: 
the gradual disappearance of the peasantry over the course of the twentieth 
century. Thirdly, development theories and policies are concerned because the 
move of peoples from the countryside into the cities increases their individual 
vulnerability. Agricultural subsistence strategies are outdated when the vast 
majority of peoples live in cities. This is one of the differences between the 
economic crisis of the 1930s and the debt crisis of the 1980s and 1990s in the 
last century. Urban subsistence strategies, however, are very different from the 
agricultural ones. Their basis is the emergence of an urban informal sector.   
 
Thus, cities are comfortable compared with the land around them. However, 
sometimes the countryside comes back into the city. In Brazil the landless 
peoples of the MST movement squat in peripheral urban sites for their 
assentamentos. The movement can better protect the squatters, and the markets 
for their informal activities as street vendors, etc., are nearby.   
   
 
Second megatrend: globalization 
 
Globalization has been defined as a process of space and time compression, that 
is, as a new mode of structuring time and space (i.e., the coordinates in which 
peoples organise their daily, ‘banal’ life.4 Time is being socialized according to 
a capitalist logic, as social commitments and rhythms are being dispensed with. 
The present is ‘omnipresent’,5 because the historical time-space is converted 
into a time point whose coordinates are determined by an economic rather than a 
social and natural rationale: ‘we sit in a “time cell” which is called “the present”. 
And we live so exclusively in this present that we remain blind to the future and 
therefore also to the possible futurelessness that lies before us’, wrote Günther 
Anders decades ago.6  The marketability of behaviour, in the economy as well as 
other societal subsystems, results as much in the forgetting of the past as in the 
loss of the future as a project. The present rules over the past and the future. The 
future appears at best as a ‘presented future’,7 as a discounted future, or as a 
simple extrapolation, as a ‘defuturized’ future and is thus transformed into the 
present of a later time wrenched out of the past.8 The market economy thus 
replaces historical time with physical-logical time, as Nicholas Georgescu-
Roegen so convincingly argued in his thermo-dynamic critique of neo-classical 
economics.9 The future is, in this conception, a quantitatively bigger ‘present 
plus’ inflated in its prognosis and the past is correspondingly a ‘present minus’. 
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The axis of time is not a historically unchangeable, directional vector but rather 
a spoke that turns around a centre which is clearly determined by the present.   
 
The same can be said of the understanding of space. It is subjected to 
organizational reason, brought accurately and methodically ‘to order’. Global 
networks follow an abstract logic, in the same way that the Spanish city planners 
planted Latin American cities on the landscape, indifferent to natural conditions, 
guided only by considerations of political rule. Buarque de Holanda applies here 
the metaphor of the ‘tile layers’, who tiled cities onto the landscape like in a 
random space.10 The lack of consideration for the actual space applies equally to 
the development of modern traffic and energy supply systems, from artificial 
lakes to dams to power-lines: here too the ‘tile layers’ are at work. Here is also 
the point of access for cultural globalization, which numbs local and national 
cultures, its integrating effect made possible by the synchronicity of local 
presents and its global reach. The cultures of the world are being melted by 
globalization into one worldwide hybrid culture. 
 
The omnipresence of the present is one result of time and space compression. 
The other is the acceleration of all processes in time and their extension in 
space. Therefore, at the end of the twentieth century a new form of ‘arbitrage 
capitalism’ is emerging, fostered by financial innovations and the rapid growth 
of financial markets as well as by new communication and transportation 
technologies. Arbitrage capitalism means that economic actors exploit 
differentials in time and space of exchange rates, interest rates, stock-market 
quotations, tax and other regulations, etc., by moving capital flows from one 
place in the world to others in real time. The system is as exploitative as pre-
industrial merchant capitalism but on a larger, global scale. It is apparently 
independent on real production or consumption and therefore much faster than 
production processes. This appearance however is an illusion. Ultimately the 
financial superstructure is dependent on the surplus value produced by labour. 
Therefore the tendency of acceleration has limits.  
 
In the world of arbitrage capitalism circulation chains have a hierarchical order. 
On the top are the big players of the international financial system, which 
exploit differentials of interest, exchange rates, and stock-market quotations. 
They are moving huge amounts of capital from one place to another following 
the smallest differentials in the global space – and triggering by doing so 
currency and financial crises which affect even big economies (Mexico 1994, 
several Asian countries 1997/98, Russia 1998, Brazil 1999, Turkey and 
Argentina 2000 & 2001). They intrude into an ‘emerging market’ (declared as 
such by international organizations like the IMF or by positive ratings by rating 
agencies) and exploit favourable conditions before leaving the ‘emerging 
market’; that is, changing a given country or a given region by means of massive 
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capital flight into ‘submerging markets’. Nearly all regions in the world are 
interlinked via financial relations, and therefore a region can only be understood 
in its dynamics insofar as the global space and the decision-making units are 
taken into account. 
 
Arbitrage compels economic agents into the informal economy, because this is 
the only place where it seems to be possible to avoid the hard budget constraints 
of global monetary standards. But the informal sector itself is a source of 
arbitrage activities, primarily on the small scale of shuttle traders, street vendors 
or minor speculators. Thus the ‘victims’ of arbitrage contribute to its 
maintenance. Whatever form arbitrage takes – criminal mafia-like businesses or 
harmless informal sector activities – its impact on the competitiveness of the 
place of production in global competition is negative.  
 
The nation state is not disappearing under the conditions of globalization. The 
‘pluriverse’ of nation state, however, is undergoing profound transformation. 
Firstly, geopolitical unilateralism is resurging, with the result that a dominant 
nation state exerts its power on all the other states. This change indicates that the 
tendency towards a deregulated, liberal ‘geo-economy’11 is countervailed by the 
other tendency towards a new geopolitical order with nation states of very 
different relational power within the world structure, and possibly towards a new 
form of imperial regulation, dominated by the United States. Secondly, there are 
states collapsing or failing or being captured by private actors such as 
transnational corporations or the powerful cartels of organized crime. This is the 
case in parts of Africa, but also in some of the transition countries of the former 
Soviet Union and in some OECD countries whose governments are highly 
influenced by firms or mafia-like organizations, as in the United States or Italy. 
Systematic grand corruption is the most usual means of capturing the state (by 
bribing public servants) for the private objectives of economic actors. Thirdly, 
the ‘orderly’ states of the OECD transform from ‘Keynesian’ interventionist 
states following the target of full employment and social security into 
‘competition states’ following the predominant objective of increasing 
competitiveness in inter-place competition.12 Thus, the nation state does not 
disappear, but it is deeply changing the ‘logics of action’.  
 
Globalization is the economic facet of juridical and political deregulation, social 
flexibilitization and liberalization. According to these tendencies, wider spaces 
for private profit maximization strategies are created and exploited by economic 
actors on a world-wide scale. It is now possible to avoid the expensive or time-
consuming regulations of the shield of social protection which traditionally 
guarantee human and/or socioeconomic security. Globalization, therefore, can 
also be interpreted as a transition into a state of less security, more instability 
and therefore an increased necessity for people to protect themselves against the 
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destabilizing consequences of global processes on a local scale. Some actors are 
able to exploit the situation of insecurity for their private well-being and profit 
so that they are better off in the time of globalization than before. They belong 
to the winners. On the other hand, there are many peoples across the world who 
belong to the exploited and are therefore forming the great majority of 
globalization losers. Traditional class structure and social cleavages are now 
reflected on a global scale. 
 
Globalization, therefore, means inclusion for some in the wealth-creating global 
process and exclusion of others who are not capable of participating in the 
gratifications of wealth-production. Financial markets exert a major influence on 
these contradictory tendencies. It is well known that since the end of the 1970s 
and the beginning of the 1980s, real interest rates on financial markets have been 
exceeding real growth rates of gross national product, so that debt service has to 
be deviated from the economic substance of debtors in the world. From 1950 
until the early 1970s, the real growth rate of GNP in the G-7 countries was 3% 
above the real interest rate; since then, real interest rates have exceeded the real 
growth rate of GNP by about 2%.13 This is one of the most important causes of 
the increased debt burden in the world and of the one-sidedness of the 
distribution of debt on the one hand and of monetary wealth and assets on the 
other hand. A permanent flow from debtors to creditors therefore results in an 
ever-growing disparity of income and wealth in the world. The well-known 
North-South divide is not only characteristic of the global system but also 
present on a national scale – it can even be observed in most cities. The North-
South divide is not a geographical but a social, political and economic one.  
 
 
Third megatrend: Informalization   
 
Cities promise inclusion into global processes via airports and harbours, banking 
facilities and centres of decision. They function as the nodes in a global 
network, as ‘global cities’.14 The countryside, in contrast, is an excluded area. 
The consequence is a turnabout of dependency-structures: Originally, the city 
depended on the surplus produced in agriculture. Now, agriculture depends on 
the city where inputs (machines, chemical ingredients, etc.) come from, prices 
are formed, logistical centres and financial institutions are located, and 
regulations are worked out. The countryside seems to be an appendage of the 
city, and this situation – or perhaps mere perception – is one reason for rural-
urban migration, which has taken place for decades in most parts of the world 
and has triggered a huge increase of urban population. 
 
It is also an illusion to imagine the modern or postmodern city as a big service 
centre for highly qualified wealthy citizens engaged in the growing information 
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sector. Instead, modern cities are divided into formal and informal sectors, 
characterized by gentrification and segmentation, by the included formal and 
excluded informal workers. The formal economy is providing positive 
gratifications for those who are working within it, while the informal one is 
providing precarious jobs and insecure living conditions. Human security – from 
public security to health and food security to education and shelter – is a real 
experience only for some parts of the city, and not for all people concerned. 
 
Empirical evidence illustrates that the informal economy in the past three 
decades has experienced momentum to a much greater degree than the formal 
one:   
 
Table 3: 
Share of informal jobs.  
 Non-agricultural 
employment 
Urban 
employment 
 
 
 
Female  Male 
New jobs Women’s share 
of the informal 
sector in the non-
agricultural 
labour force 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
57  40 83  
Bolivia  74 55  51 
Brazil  67 55  47 
Chile  44 31  46 
Colombia  44 42  50 
Mexico  55 44  44 
Venezuela  47 47  38 
Africa 
78  61 93  
Benin  97 83  62 
Guinea  84 61  37 
Kenya  83 59  60 
Mali  96 91  59 
South Africa  30 14  61 
Tunisia  39 52  18 
Asia 
45-85  40-60  NA 
India  91 70  23 
Indonesia  88 69  43 
Philippines  64 66  46 
Thailand  54 49  47 
Source: Wiego: Women in Informal Employment, pp. 8, 9 
 
The informalization of cities is a reality in the course of global transformations 
of labour relations, financial markets and political regulation. In the expert 
report ‘Urban 21’ on behalf of the world commission ‘Urban’ in 1999, a major 
basic trend of modern cities was identified: ‘informal and too fast’ growth of 
urban agglomerations. Migration into cities and high birth rates are responsible 
for a future oversupply of minimally qualified working people and therefore of 
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an increase of those strata with low income and restricted access to public 
goods. These people are the reserve of the informal sector, which generates only 
low tax receipts for the city government and therefore fosters a chronic neglect 
of infrastructure per inhabitant. One of the consequences of this insane 
development is a considerable increase of poverty and misery in big cities. 
Women are especially affected by poverty and informalization.  
 
Informal structures and logics of individual as well as institutional and 
administrational action are responsible for the increasing insecurity of peoples. 
Many lose social security protection when they are excluded from the formal 
workplace. Public security is diminishing due to urban financial crises and then 
being privatized so that only the rich are able to buy security as a market 
commodity. The public goods which provided formal security disappear; the 
private supply on markets is accessible only for those who dispose of monetary 
purchasing power, and for the great majority, informal provision of formerly 
public goods becomes a condition of survival. Thus the informal city is a 
divided city, consisting of a secure and an insecure part, of rich and poor barrios, 
of those who are included into gated areas and the others who are excluded or 
accepted as a new servant class for the people living in gated areas. 
 
Insofar as citizens are forced to buy security on markets they are transformed 
from citizens into consumers, into demanders of a supply provided by private 
firms. Of course, one has to be careful because it is an empirical question, how 
the private supply of goods such as security really substitutes the public sphere 
for the private one. It is also a difference between privatization and 
commercialization, which means different things in different circumstances. 
However, in many parts of the world this or that form of privatization of security 
and other public goods takes place, so that private security agencies as the 
suppliers of a commercialized good find their markets, as do suppliers of light 
weapons and other armament. This development has also an impact on the 
police forces in a given country, especially in the big cities. On the one hand 
they are the agents responsible for public security, on the other hand they 
collaborate with private security providers and sometimes they belong 
themselves to private security firms, so that they must have an interest in a 
certain degree of insecurity in order to enhance the demand for security 
products. Corruption always plays a crucial and decisive role. And corruption by 
its very nature is a method of private appropriation of public goods by means of 
the collusion between private and public actors. 
 
The most visible phenomenon of the divide between excluded and included 
areas of insecure and secure places is the gated community, which exists in 
nearly all big cities, although its organization and articulation with ‘the rest of 
the city’ varies widely from country to country and city to city. Country clubs, 
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the predecessors of gated communities, have a long tradition. But gated 
communities and condominiums are a step forward from the rural horizon into 
the urban one. Gated cities are the special aspect of the formal-informal divide 
of modern cities. One response to the growth of gated community is an 
analogous reaction of those excluded. They also organize their barrios as 
protected areas where access is controlled by organized gangs of the quarter. So 
the modern city is tendentially prone to a double segregation, one actively 
realized by the rich in gated areas, the other defending against insecurity by 
organizing control of popular quarters.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Once again it has to be noticed that these tendencies exist only in abstracto and 
they are very different from place to place, so that much empirical research has 
to be undertaken in order to understand better the historically, culturally, 
politically very specific articulations between inclusion and exclusion of local 
places in times of globalization. One general feature of the informal city, 
however, has to do with time and space-compression under conditions of 
globalization: the rapid growth of cities that has already been mentioned in the 
section on urbanization above. When cities grow slowly, the divide between 
formal and informal does not – or only to a minimal extent – exist. Such cities 
grow organically, with regard to land and time-scape and to the human and 
social needs of the citizen. Therefore, the old cities from the medieval period 
through the nineteenth century appear as having been idyllic places. Only in 
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times of modernity have new quarters been attached to the old structures, 
obeying the logic of the ‘tile layers’. An example of this may be seen on a map 
of a small Adriatic port-town in Apulia, south of Bari. It is designed for optimal 
orientation by visitors of the town. The contrast between the seemingly 
unordered maze of streets of the centro storico and the right angles of the new 
housing blocks along perfectly straight streets is striking: ‘like tiles’, as Buarque 
de Holanda described Spanish city planning in Latin America. The contours of 
the old city conform to those of the coast and land, the new city conforms to the 
logic of the city planners, indifferent to natural features. The prices of the 
properties are more relevant than the natural relief. The logic of capital 
supersedes the logic of nature. The centro storico, which seems as disordered as 
many modern barrios or favelas, has grown over centuries and not within 
months – and this time difference is decisive for the relationship of formal and 
informal urban structures. Informality thus can be interpreted as a consequence 
of acceleration and different time and space regimes of urban processes. 
 
Whereas in Apulia the square-structure has been built only in recent decades 
since the 1960s and the ‘disorderly’ structure of the centro storico evolved over 
centuries before, in modern cities of Latin America the contrary occurred. 
Initially there were the formal structures of a properly planned city, like Oskar 
Niemeyer’s city of Brasilia, or the city of Maraba in the Eastern part of 
Amazonia which was designed based on the leaves of the castanha de para tree, 
or Villanuevas city of Caracas. But after the formal and orderly city 
environment with streets and squares and skyscrapers was built, the disorderly 
invasion of squatters took place. They occupy the apparently empty spaces 
between the formal buildings. The informal city is then built in a very short 
time. This marks the difference between the slowly developing centro storico of 
an old town and the fast construction of a shantytown in the midst of a formal 
city-structure so that the whole city seems to display a disarticulated and 
informal structure.  
 
 
The global informal city and its emancipatory potential 
 
Contemporary cities have no permanence; they exist as long as they are able to 
perform a function within the global network. The ‘eternal city’ that Rome once 
was, no longer exists. Of course, cities do not disappear from the earth, but they 
change their functional place in global space with heavy consequences for the 
territory and the people living there. The globalized city is thus reduced to a 
place within the network where particular functions are efficiently served. The 
remaining characteristics – the way of life of inhabitants, the culture, the 
architectural style, history and tradition – are façades covering the bare 
functionality of the city in the global network. This aspect of disembeddedness 
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is the flip side of the city’s inclusion in a global network, it is the price to be 
paid for functional acceptance as a ‘global city’. This inclusion results, however, 
in the exclusion of all others. All those included in the global network live 
according to standards which are not those of the local inhabitants. These are the 
standards of a globalized ‘McWorld’-society. They build their ‘gated 
communities’ as ghettos in which those who belong to the world of money can 
segregate themselves from the rest of the urban populace. Those excluded live in 
the global city as well, but gain little or nothing from it. Many of them are 
pushed into a subaltern position as members of a new service class which 
functionally serves the formal centres in the back offices or within the gated 
communities as housemaids in the households of the better-offs.15 In the global 
city, they are dependent on local circumstances for their own security if not 
survival.  
 
Cities have always been places where the contrast between societal wealth and 
poverty was so evident that it became a metaphor for social contrasts, inequality 
and social conflicts. The rich have always protected themselves from the 
‘imposition’ (as they perceived it) of the poor. But the rich had as much of a 
territorial connection to the city as the poor and this united them, as it formed a 
common basis for city politics, in particular for the provision of public goods, 
from urban parks to a local healthcare system, from education to food safety and 
security, from public security to the city’s esteem in the world.  
 
Disorder seems to be the rule of informal growth. However, this obviously is 
only half of the truth. On the one hand, order comes back, thanks to those 
techniques which Michel Foucault (1978) described as ‘technologies of the 
self”. The counterpart of the un-governability of modern cities is 
‘governmentality’ (gouvernementalité), i.e. the emergence of a mentality of the 
governed which allows the government (and its elitist allies) to govern the 
people. The dialectics of surveillance, punishment and a mentality of self-
discipline16 are a powerful basis for ‘neoliberalism from below’:17 people 
organize their lives by making use of even poor market possibilities, and by 
doing so they follow on a low and predominantly local or regional level the 
same logic of action that the elite and the big transnational actors apply on a 
higher and global scale. The congruence of the logics of action is an important 
factor of integration of socially different societies and divided classes. The 
segregation between the excluded and the favoured included seems to disappear. 
 
This is the reason why books like that of Hernando de Soto on the ‘Mysteries of 
Capitalism’18 are so successful, not only in Latin America but also worldwide. 
De Soto offers simple and at a first glance convincing solutions for those 
excluded to become included in the system of formal gratifications by applying 
the common logic of the system (i.e., through the establishment of private 
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property rights). This ‘founding act’ immediately changes the formerly excluded 
poor and informals into small-scale capitalists because thanks to the property 
rights they have capital stock at their disposal. This might help them, for 
example, by providing the collateral to get financial credit for (small) investment 
from a bank. The message is simple and clear: ‘dead capital’ must be revitalized 
through the distribution of property rights, and immediately the informal and 
poor vendor will begin to develop the inborn properties of man as entrepreneur. 
Then the difference between such individuals and the powerful managers of 
transnational corporations is only a gradual, and not a principal one. All men 
and women are following the same logic of action.  
 
Of course, this interpretation is simplistic, and even dangerous. Men are not by 
birth entrepreneurs. Moreover, it is socially impossible for everyone to become a 
capitalist, since some must remain workers to be hired by capitalists. Whether 
credit is useful for the new entrepreneurs depends on the interest rate and the 
overall debt service to be paid. Last but not least, in modern societies most 
property is already distributed so that one has to deal with competing property 
rights. The case presented by de Soto as a positive example is the colonization 
of the ‘wild West’ in North America during the nineteenth century and the 
simple distribution of property rights which transformed illegal squatters into 
honourable landowners. But de Soto forgets the violence involved and the 
eradication of great parts of the indigenous population. However, de Soto’s 
argument can also be reversed, e.g. by the movements of the landless people in 
Brazil (MST) for redistribution of property rights to land which is not used and 
idle or not adequately used by big latifundistas. 
 
The neoliberal project from below is helpful for governments to resolve local 
economic problems stemming from the working of global markets. Former 
Brazilian president Fernando Enrique Cardoso explicitly conceived the informal 
sector as a kind of ‘shock absorber’ of globalization: 
 
Globalization means competition founded on higher levels of productivity. That is 
to say more output per unit of labour. Unemployment has therefore resulted from 
the very reasons that make an economy successfully competitive…. [Therefore it is 
necessary] to make the regulatory framework of labour more flexible so as to 
preserve jobs by, for example, allowing companies and workers to negotiate freely 
a range as wide as possible of issues such as a number of working hours and 
vacation days, payment of hours exceeding the normal working day, etc. Flexibility 
of labour relations should also result in lesser costs for the hiring of workers.... In 
countries with large population such as Brazil and India consideration must also be 
given to the operation of the so-called informal economy as far as job creation is 
concerned.19  
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Today, it is obvious that informality is an expression of structural adjustment to 
global market forces, sometimes under the pressure of international financial 
institutions (IMF, World Bank, etc.). This development perfectly fits into the 
model of governmentality, since workers very often prefer a bad and precarious, 
often over-exploited job in order to be included in society and to avoid the social 
stigma of exclusion. The ideology of self-manship behind these tendencies is 
extremely supportive to the functioning of the market system even though it is 
crisis-ridden and producing growing unemployment.  
 
On the other hand, informality and its related insecurity give rise to the 
development of alternative forms of economic and social cooperation, the 
rediscovery of the old experiences of cooperatives and of a ‘moral’ or ‘solidary’ 
economy. Sometimes the economia solidaria is nothing more than the product of 
a state of economic emergency. When the formal money disappears, new 
‘informal’ forms of money, new currencies of exchange circles are coming into 
existence, e.g. in Argentina in the course of the deep and disastrous financial 
crisis after 2001. In Chile, cooperatives emerged as organizations of mutual 
assistance during the military dictatorship after 1973 in order to overcome the 
social consequences of neoliberal economic reforms. In Brazil, the new 
president Lula da Silva has established a new branch of his government to deal 
with the challenges of new forms of self-help and self-organization in society. 
This formal government initiative is the converse of the cynical 
instrumentalization of the informal sector as a shock absorber against the 
negative effects of globalization as proposed by Fernando Henrique Cardoso.  
 
The informal sector is understood as an offspring of alternative economic and 
social forms for achieving a bundle of political objectives: the formation of 
cooperatives and micro-credit organizations, the support of local and regional 
networking through use of modern media, education for capacity-building and 
(as Pierre Bourdieu phrased it) ‘economic alphabetization’ in order to critically 
understand the logics of globalization, public subsidies to cooperatives for 
compensating their disadvantages on formal markets, support of cooperation 
with universities and other public institutions, creation of a legal framework 
which contains much more than the mere distribution of property rights.  
 
The basic idea is that the informal places in the global space are much more than 
an excluded area. They represent an alternative form of response to the 
overarching tendencies of globalization. People themselves have reacted 
collectively against the social forces of exclusion, sometimes organized, very 
often supported by NGOs and intellectuals from research institutions (in Brazil, 
Herbert de Souza, called Betinho, represents perfectly this kind of ‘organic 
intellectual’ who is part of the movement. Additionally, universities give advice 
to workers who have occupied their enterprises, to landless people who occupy 
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their land in order to push for long-promised land reform, to street vendors who 
try to establish a legalized formal marketplace, to indebted small firms on 
reducing debt burden, etc. Formal institutions such as city councils or national 
governments can assist these initiatives of self-organization and empower 
people in their barrios, favelas or quarters. However, it also has to be taken into 
consideration that empowerment on a local level is not sufficient, due to the 
tendencies of globalization. Self-organization and empowerment must be 
complemented by global regulations. Otherwise the positive effects will be very 
small. In Venezuela the articulation of local and global processes is obvious due 
to the weight of the PDVSA, the state run oil-producing corporation, in 
Venezuelan social, political and economic life. The PDVSA is the main 
exporter; it contributes immensely to the state budget, its economic and political 
power is overwhelming, not to mention the symbolic power of this global player 
in the national self-consciousness.  
 
The message is very clear and unequivocal: excluded informal workers are 
potentially the germ cell of a new solidary economy which deserves our 
intellectual attention and political support and economic assistance. It is the 
countervailing weight to the model of “neoliberalism from below”. Paul Singer, 
the Brazilian social scientist and adviser to President Lula on the “solidary 
economy” explains in a paper: ‘The “solidary economy” is…a choice of work 
and lifestyle, in which cooperation and solidarity are preferred to competition of 
everyone against each other. It is a way of conceiving the world 
(Weltanschauung) that has been critical of capitalism in Brazil and everywhere 
else for the last two centuries. So it is not only a response to need – although that 
is the main point – it is also a choice…. It also represents a new response by left-
wing parties and unions, church members, Indians and small peasants to the 
demands for a better society, combining individual freedom, social and 
economic security with equality.’20 The alternative of a solidary economy is so 
strong because the neoliberal alternative – whether it comes from above or 
emerges from below – offers no potential for a decent and secure life in peace 
and freedom for a majority of peoples all across the world. But we also have to 
be aware that an urban solidary economy, based on the experiences of the 
informal sector, needs protection against the negative effects of globalization 
through the introduction of new modes of regulation of trade, of financial flows, 
of migration and of cultural exchange. 
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